The
Battle of (or Massacre at) Cajamarca was a surprise attack on the
Inca royal entourage orchestrated by
Francisco Pizarro. Sprung in the evening of
November 16,
1532 in the great plaza of
Cajamarca, the ambush, lasting no more than half an hour, achieved its singular goal of capturing Emperor
Atahualpa.
The confrontation at Cajamarca was the culmination of a months-long contest of espionage, subterfuge, and diplomacy conducted by Pizarro and the Inca via their respective envoys. Atahualpa had received the invaders from a position of immense strength. Encamped along the heights of Cajamarca with legions of battle-tested troops fresh from their victories in the civil war against his half-brother Huascar, the Inca had little to fear from Pizarro's minute army, however extravagant its dress and weaponry. In a calculated show of goodwill, he had lured the adventurers deep into the heart of his mountain empire where any potential threat could be met with a show of force. The Spaniards arrived on November 15.
Atahualpa unlike Moctezuma in Mexico knew right away that these men were not gods nor were they representative of the gods. The reports from his own spies confirmed that. According to Spanish sources, planned to recruit a few of the conquistadores into his own service and to appropriate Spanish firearms and horses for his armies. He would then execute the others at his leisure.
According to a book called History Of The Conquest Of Peru, written by 19th century author William H. Prescott, he recounts the Spanish invasion in the city plaza, any assault on the Inca armies overlooking the valley would have rightly seemed suicidal. Retreat was equally out of the question, because any gesture of weakness that might undermine their inflated display of potency would invite furious pursuit and the sealing of the mountain passes. Once the great stone fortresses dotting their route of escape were garrisoned, argued Pizarro, they would prove impenetrable. But to do nothing, he added, to dally in the fragile and fleeting safety of the Inca's good graces, was no better, since prolonged contact with the natives would erode the fears of Spanish supernaturality that kept them at bay. Unlike his kinsman Cortes, whom Pizarro emulated and who could at least could call on Spanish reinforcements from at least 200 miles away in Veracruz, Pizarro's nearest Spanish reinforcements were nearly 2000 miles away in Panama.
