Periods of trench warfare occurred during the American Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War and the Second Anglo-Boer War, but trench warfare is mainly associated with World War I, when it lasted on the Western Front from September 1914[2] until the last weeks of the war. By the end of October 1914 the whole front in Belgium and France had solidified into lines of trenches, as it became clear that infantry assaults were futile in the face of rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. Both sides concentrated on breaking up enemy attacks and on protecting their own troops by digging deep into the ground.[3] Trench warfare was also conducted on other fronts, including Italy and Gallipoli.
Trench warfare has become a powerful symbol of the futility of war. [4] Its image is of young men going “over the top”[5] into a maelstrom of fire leading to certain death, typified by the first day of the Somme (on which the British suffered 57,000 casualties) or the grinding slaughter in the mud of Passchendaele. To the French, the equivalent is the appalling attrition of the “Wringer of Verdun” in which they suffered 380,000 casualties.[6] Trench warfare is associated with needless slaughter in appalling conditions, combined with the view that brave men went to their deaths because of incompetent and narrow-minded commanders who failed to adapt to the new conditions of trench warfare. Class-ridden and backward-looking generals put their faith in the attack, believing that superior morale and dash would overcome the weapons and moral inferiority of the defender.[7] The British and Empire troops on the Western Front are commonly referred to as “lions led by donkeys”.[8]
In fact the picture is far more complex. It is easy to find examples of backward and inflexible generals early in World War I. There were immense, futile failures such as Passchedaele, and Sir Douglas Haig is criticised for allowing his battles to continue long after they had lost any purpose other than attrition.[9] Lives were thrown away in pointless trench raiding and patrolling.[10] There was an emphasis on seeking near-impossible breakthroughs, rather than being content with "bite and hold" battles. But there were also immense tactical and technical innovations. The problems of trench warfare were recognised, and attempts were made to address them. Solutions included improvements in artillery, better infantry tactics and the development of tanks. The lessons of the first day of the Somme were learned very quickly, and by 1918 attacks were generally more successful and suffered fewer casualties; in the hundred days there was even a return to mobile warfare. The Allies eventually achieved a decisive victory. Victory felt hollow, due to its immense cost, its suddenness and the absence of the satisfaction of occupying Germany, making it harder for the generals to claim or receive credit for it. In Britain, the reputations of the generals suffered from postwar attacks by prominent politicians[11] deflecting blame from their own conduct of the war, from tactical experts promoting their own reputations [12] and from nationalistic commentators from Empire nations blaming their British commanders for their losses.[13] The Germans certainly fared no better than the Allies, and it is difficult to see what alternatives were available in the conditions of the time.[14]
