As the military action against Libya to give teeth to U.N. SecurityCouncil resolution 1973 began, one question kept nagging away: Why,precisely, were the governments of Britain and France in the lead?Why were their armed forces taking part in the military action, andwhy had their diplomats done the grunt work in the negotiationsthat led to adoption of the resolution? It is not an easy question to answer. British Prime Minister DavidCameron said that the military action against Muammar Gaddafi was"necessary, it is legal and it is right." Right, "because I don'tbelieve that we should stand aside while this dictator murders hisown people." French President Sarkozy said, "If we intervene on theside of the Arab nations it is because of a universal consciencethat cannot tolerate such crimes." I'm not one of those cynics whoassumes that such statements are devoid of content; in any event,they are grounded in language that was already quite condemnatoryof Libya in resolution 1973. But the rhetoric doesn't really answerthe question: Why intervene? (See why Gaddafi is determined to keep power at all costs.) Is what happens in Libya of direct national interest to Britain andFrance? To be sure, Libya is across the Mediterranean Sea fromEurope, and its trade is directed mainly there. But Libya is anation of only 6.5 million people. For comparison, that is a bitmore than the population of El Salvador and a bit less thanHonduras', and whatever happened in the Cold War, it's been a whilesince U.S. policymakers have argued that what goes on in CentralAmerican nations is of such pressing national interest to the U.S.that it would legitimize armed intervention there. Libya has oil and gas, yes but less than 2% of the world'soil reserves, while technology is about to make gas available insuch abundance that it hardly matters which country has it. It'shard to make the case that there is some pressing commercial reasonfor Britain and France to take the lead in the way that they havedone, which will not stop those who see oil companies behind everyforeign military adventure doing so. Immigration? Yes, instability in the Maghreb tends to produce flowsof migrants north. And in the case of Libya, even if those fleeingthe fighting go first to Italy, they can make their way eventuallyto other nations of the European Union. But it's pretty hard toimagine that there would be some unmanageable refugee crisis inNorth Africa if Muammar Gaddafi held on to power in Libya. TheMediterranean is a wide sea; it's not a border that you can justwalk across. (See TIME's photos of Libya in revolt.) History? Britain, despite its rapprochement with Gaddafi under thegovernment of Tony Blair, has little reason to love or trust theLibyan leader Libyan agents were responsible for the downingof Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland, and a London policewoman,Yvonne Fletcher, was shot dead from the Libyan embassy in 1984. Buthorrible though those crimes were, nobody is suggesting that theirmemory is a reason to go to war. Getting back in people's good books? Sarkozy started off on thewrong side of the Arab Spring, his government staying cozilyentwined with that of Tunisia when the street had turned againstit. I've heard it suggested that he's taking the lead on Libya soas to recover France's reputation in the Arab world. If so, this isa mighty risky way of going about it: military intervention inLibya is not guaranteed to be a success, and nor is it uniformlypopular among Arabs, even those who have been demonstrating fordemocracy around the region. What about delusions of grandeur? There will be those who arguethat France and Britain are behaving the way they are simplybecause they think their history entitles them to, because theywant to show that they are still great powers. But assuming thatCameron and Sarkozy are rational decisionmakers (I do) that justdoesn't fly. Both Britain and France are democracies. In neither ofthem is military adventurism popular with voters. That leaves two factors that might go some way to explain theFranco-British policy. First, I suspect that there is a genuinebelief in both governments that while the U.S. is still the world'sbalance wheel, the indispensable nation, it cannot do everythingand should not be asked to that the world is a more secureplace if other democracies help the U.S. carry the diplomatic andmilitary load of ensuring global stability. To be sure, such apolicy can go disastrously wrong, as most British observers wouldsay was true of their country's alliance with the U.S. in the Iraqwar. But that does not mean that the principle is worthless. (Watch the passionate Libyan rebels in action.) Second, it would not surprise me if both governments andthat of the U.S. came to a conclusion that former BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair elaborated on in an article in the Times of London and the Wall Street Journal . When faced with a crisis like that of Libya, Blair argued,"Inaction is a decision, a policy with consequences. The wish tokeep out of it all is entirely understandable; but it is every bitas much of a decision as acting." Britain, France, the U.S. and every nation under the sun could, Isuppose, have said nothing at all when Gaddafi started turning onthose demonstrating against his rule three weeks ago. But they didnot. They condemned him out of hand. To have done nothing now, whenit seemed as if Gaddafi was going to win Libya's civil war, wouldhave been a decision in and of itself, and one, moreover, thatwould have exposed the weakness of those who had so recently calledfor him to go. Looked at in that light, the decision to start military action inLibya however wise or unwise that may turn out to be starts at least to be comprehensible. See TIME's top 10 everything of 2010. See TIME's special report "The Middle East in Revolt.". I am an expert from aluminum-slidingdoors.com, while we provides the quality product, such as Partition Sliding Doors Manufacturer , Side Hinged Doors, Partition Sliding Doors,and more.
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