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From Nature magazine The packages that started arriving by FedEx on 12 October last yearcame with strict instructions: protect the information within anddestroy it after review. Inside were two manuscripts showing howthe deadly H5N1 avian influenza virus could be made to transmit between mammals. The recipients ofthese packages — eight members of the US National ScienceAdvisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) — faced the unenviabletask of deciding whether the research was safe to publish. The group deliberated. Soon, the rest of the NSABB's 22 votingmembers and two dozen non-voting members and advisers were drawnin. For five-and-a-half weeks, they pored over the data in thepapers, weighing the benefits of sharing the information againstthe risk that doing so might lead to the accidental or intentionalrelease of a lethal new virus. They exchanged views in hundreds ofe-mails and in more than 24 hours of teleconference calls. On 21 November, the NSABB recommended that journals should redactthe papers, publishing their conclusions but sharing methods anddata only with approved scientists and health officials. It was thefirst time that the board had recommended any such restrictionsince it was convened in 2005, and it sparked a global debate— aired in journals, meetings, blogs and newspapers —that is still raging and has left the US government in an awkwardspot. "The United States funded this research and then wantedto censor it," says David Fidler, who teaches internationallaw at Indiana University Bloomington. "This lookeddysfunctional." Throughout these turbulent months, the spotlight has shone as muchon the NSABB as it has on the mutant flu viruses. The board'smembers, with backgrounds ranging from biology to medicine tonational security and law, have been developing guidelines forbiosecurity oversight for nearly seven years. The flu research wasa major test of the principles they had been espousing. By all appearances, the board struggled. By mid-February, the NSABBwas under pressure to overturn its initial assessment. And in thelast days of March, it did — voting unanimously in favour offull publication for one paper, which appeared early this month 1 . The board also recommended that the second paper be published,but six members dissented, arguing that the work still posedsignificant concerns. (That paper's publication is expected withinweeks.) The whole episode has left many people with questions.Could the board have done better? Why wasn't the research flaggedearlier? And is there a way to publish sensitive information whileminimizing risks? There is one point of agreement, says David Relman, amicrobiologist at Stanford University in California and member ofthe NSABB: "This is not the way any of us wants to see theseissues discussed, that is, at the eleventh hour and fifty-ninthminute." Security scare The NSABB's roots can be traced back to October 2001, when letterscarrying anthrax spores were sent to several public figures aroundthe country (see 'Threat and response' ). In response, the US government invested billions of dollars toprepare for future acts of bioterror, much of it channelled intopathogen research through the National Institute of Allergy andInfectious Diseases (NIAID) in Bethesda, Maryland. In parallel,Congress asked the National Academies to form a panel to recommendhow dual-use research — work that could carry bioterror risksas well as benefits — should be identified, regulated andreported. Scientists were anxious to show that they could policetheir own work and avoid heavy-handed or cumbersome regulation fromabove. "The science community ought to come up with a processbefore the public demands the government do it for them,"warned Parney Albright of the US Department of Homeland Security in2003 . The e-commerce company in China offers quality products such as Modular Booth Systems Manufacturer , China Exhibition Booth Display, and more. For more , please visit Exhibition Booth Display today!
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