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A Diet committee will try to determine who is telling the truthabout a key phase in the Fukushima nuclear disaster : politicians or executives of Tokyo Electric Power Co. The issue concerns disturbing allegations from politicians thatTEPCO wanted to abandon the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plantduring the early stages of the disaster last year, a move thatcould have exacerbated the crisis. TEPCO has vehemently denied the company had any plans to desert thestricken plant. But from May 17, politicians will be summoned tothe Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent InvestigationCommission to give their side of the story. The central government's Investigation Committee on the Accident atthe Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations and TEPCO's Fukushima NuclearAccidents Investigation Committee have released interim reportsabout their respective efforts in dealing with the nucleardisaster. The private-sector Independent Investigation Commissionon the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident also released its finalreport in late February. All three accounts have differing interpretations of whattranspired between TEPCO executives and government officialsbetween the night of March 14 and early morning of March 15 of lastyear. TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata told the Diet panel on May 14that there were never any consultations between TEPCO officials andgovernment officials about evacuating all workers from theFukushima No. 1 plant. "In the evening of March 14, there was discussion about whetherthose workers not directly involved in work to restore operationsshould be evacuated," Katsumata said. The chairman s explanation of the talks between TEPCO and centralgovernment officials was in line with an appendix attached to theTEPCO panel's interim report released last December. "The gist of the exchange was: 'Because the situation at the plantis difficult, we want consideration to be given to temporarilyevacuating workers who are not directly involved in the work whenthat need arises.' We never thought about (total withdrawal) norasked that all workers be allowed to leave," the appendix said. But the report by the private-sector panel had a different view: Considering the fact that many officials in the prime minister'soffice took the TEPCO request to mean it wanted all workers pulledout, it is difficult to state there was sufficient basis to supportTEPCO's argument." The private-sector panel report described how Masataka Shimizu,TEPCO's president at the time, made calls to Banri Kaieda, then theindustry minister, and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano todiscuss the possibility of pulling the workers out. According to the report, Shimizu told Edano: "Something has to bedone. The on-site situation cannot be maintained much longer." The central government panel s interim report said Shimizu'sfailure to clearly state that the workers needed to battle thecrisis would remain led to the conclusion reached by manygovernment officials that the utility wanted to evacuate all of itsworkers. Early on March 15, Shimizu called Nobuaki Terasaka, thendirector-general of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, andsaid, "We feel that evacuation might become a reality if thesituation becomes much more severe." At that time, Shimizu neversaid the needed workers would remain at the site. However, when Shimizu was called to the prime minister's office atabout 4 a.m. on March 15 and was asked about pulling out TEPCOworkers, he said, "We have never considered such a possibility." Reporters for The Asahi Shimbun have gathered information about theexchange between TEPCO executives and government officials. Some oftheir articles have been translated into English under "ThePrometheus Trap" heading. Sources have told The Asahi Shimbun that Shimizu called Kaieda andEdano on the night of March 14 to request the pullout of TEPCOworkers. Tetsuro Ito, the deputy chief Cabinet secretary for crisismanagement, was told directly by a TEPCO official in the primeminister's office that the utility wanted to "abandon" theFukushima No. 1 plant and "evacuate" from the Fukushima No. 2plant, the sources said. Shimizu tried calling Kaieda's aide a number of times between 7p.m. and 9 p.m. on March 14. At that time, the core pressure in theNo. 2 reactor at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant was rising andthe situation was becoming precarious. After midnight on March 14, Shimizu called Edano. In a recent interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Edano said, "If theywere only thinking about partial evacuation, there would have beenno need to call me in the first place." Cabinet ministers told then Prime Minister Naoto Kan about TEPCO'srequest to evacuate its workers around 3 a.m. March 15. Having just awakened from a nap, Kan said: "Do they realize whatcould happen if they evacuated? That just cannot be allowed tohappen." Shortly thereafter, Kan summoned Shimizu to the prime minister'soffice and told him, "Evacuation is just not possible." Shimizu replied, "Yes, I understand." Kaieda and others in attendance were stunned at Shimizu's immediateacceptance of Kan's warning, the sources said. Edano was recently asked about the central government panel'sinterpretation that government officials had misunderstood whatShimizu had in mind. Edano said: "(At the time of the interim report) politicians hadnot yet been questioned so that is why it turned out that way. I amconfident the contents will change by the time of the finalreport." NO. 4 REACTOR Another issue that will be examined is why the central governmentand TEPCO were unable to sufficiently grasp the extent of theaccident as it was unfolding, particularly the state of the poolstoring spent fuel rods in the No. 4 reactor building. The No. 4 reactor had stopped operations for periodic inspectionwhen the Great East Japan Earthquake struck. For that reason, allnuclear fuel had been moved from the reactor core to the pool,meaning that the water temperature of the pool would increase at afaster rate. There were fears at first that the pool had in factdried up. The central government's headquarters to deal with the nuclearaccident raised such concerns at a meeting held from 4:40 p.m. onMarch 16, 2011. A summary of minutes from the meeting has Kan saying, "Thetemperature of the No. 4 reactor pool is rising, and the situationis worrisome." At the same time, notes that were used to compile the summary haveKan saying: "The pool in the No. 4 reactor has reached the boilingpoint. It is empty. Heat was given off and caused a fire." In an interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Kan said: "The fact thatthe water temperature in the pool was rising means there was waterin it. After having said that, I would never say there was no waterin the pool." But the failure of government officials to compile accurate minutesof that meeting will make it difficult to determine what exactlywas said. (This article was compiled from reports by Hideaki Kimura, KiyoshiOkonogi and Hisashi Hattori.) To read a commentary by Senior Staff Writer Keiji Takeuchi on theissue, visit: ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201205160088 * * * The following are some of The Asahi Shimbun stories on theFukushima nuclear disaster. (1) Investigations into Fukushima accident disagree on key points ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201205010090 (2) The Prometheus Trap/ 5 days in the Prime Minister's Office ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201203090078 (3) INTERVIEW/ YOICHI FUNABASHI: Fukushima nuclear crisis revealedJapan's governing defects ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201202290078. I am an expert from encrustingmachines.com, while we provides the quality product, such as China Food Processing Machineries , Croissant Machines, Automatic Encrusting and Forming Machine,and more.
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