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A day after the first anniversary of the Navy SEAL raid that killedOsama bin Laden, the U.S. launched a rare public relations exerciseagainst the late leader of al-Qaeda by releasing a partial butrevealing tranche of the documents seized during the raid at thecompound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The first group of 17 ‘Letters from Abbottabad' were openedup to the public by the U.S. Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC) atWest Point military academy, and they suggested that the al-Qaedawas no different to ordinary corporate or social organisations inits proclivity to get caught up in the politics of internalsquabbles and acrimony, mostly against other terror groups such asthe Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The letters have been vetted and translated by counterterrorismexperts at the CTC and are in electronic form totalling 175 pagesin the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. Inthis first tranche, the earliest letter is dated September 2006 andthe latest April 2011, with the internal al-Qaeda communicationsauthored by several leaders, including bin Laden, Atiyya Abdal-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and the American terror suspect AdamGadahn. On the one hand, the sheer range of discussants engaged incommunications with al-Qaeda points to the depth ofinterconnections between a number of high-profile terror groups.Examples include Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, leader of the Somalimilitant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Nasir al-Wuhayshi,leader of the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP);and Anwar al-`Awlaqi; and Hakimullah Mahsud, leader of the TTP. Yet equally the letters show cracks and ideological and tacticalrifts opening up between these the leaders of these organisations.For example in one letter (SOCOM-2012-0000004) written by Gadhan inJanuary 2011, he sharply criticises the tactics and targetingcalculus of the Islamic State of Iraq and the TTP, while stronglyadvocating that al-Qaeda publicly dissociate itself from bothgroups. In another letter (SOCOM-2012-0000005), bin Laden himself politelyrefuses a request from al-Shabaab's leader al-Zubayr for formalunity with al-Qaeda. Ironically after bin Ladin's death, the Somalimilitant group merged with al- Qaeda. Most revealingly, one letter from al-Qaeda's al-Hasan and al-Libithe amir of the TTP, Hakimullah Mahsud, hints at deep-seated ideologicaland strategic differences. Dated December 3 2010, the letter(SOCOM-2012-0000007) lays bare the serious concerns that theal-Qaeda bosses had about the TTP's tactics within Pakistan, withan eye on the consequences that the TTP's "misguidedoperations" might have on al-Qaeda and other terror groups inthe region. Specifically the CTC experts reviewing the letters noted that theal-Qaeda authors identified several errors committed by the TTP,including Hakimullah Mahsud's arrogation of privileges andpositions beyond what was appropriate as the TTP's amir ; the TTP's use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslimcivilians, and the group's use of kidnapping. Such disenchantment among some of terror bosses about al-Qaeda'swillingness to carry out attacks that could affect Muslims appearsto be a theme within the Abbottabad letters. Another letter(SOCOM-2012-0000018) released by the CTC on Thursday, sent to binLaden from "a loving brother whom you know and who knowsyou" is critical of bin Laden for allowing attacks on"Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula inparticular." The author of this missive enumerated numerous deleteriousconsequences of engaging in jihad inside Saudi Arabia, and informed Zamarai , a nickname for bin Laden, that people were "repulsed by thetechnical term ‘jihad' and even forbidden to use it inlectures," and the author strongly advised bin Laden tochange his policies. I am an expert from riot-police-gear.com, while we provides the quality product, such as Police Duty Belt , Handheld Metal Detector, Riot Police Gear,and more.
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