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Much of the conjecture we are hearing coming from the P5+1 (FivePermanent Security Council Members United States, Russia, China,England, and France plus Germany) negotiations with Iran over theIranian nuclear program has been very troubling. There have beenmentions that the fact that the Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwaclassifying the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear weaponsby an Islamic entity to be a grave sin. According the United StatesState Department this has to be taken into consideration whenaddressing the Iranian nuclear program. This fatwa by the IranianSupreme Leader must be regarded as a validation of the peacefulintent of the Iranians and as a strong indicator that it isimpossible for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons while he remainstheir Supreme Leader. They attribute their certainty to the powerof this fatwa to their deep respect and understanding of Islam, theKoran, Sharia and all aspects of Muslim life, politics, andreligious influences. Well, there is another not so insignificantaspect of Islamic law, namely taqiyya. Taqiyya is the allowance,almost a commandment and not merely suggestion, for Muslims to lieto non-Muslims especially if it will further the spread of Islam.Just possibly this would allow for an Islamic cleric, such as theIranian Supreme Leader, to issue a fatwa which is invalid andintended to serve the purpose of concealing actions forbidden bythis false fatwa. Do you think perhaps the State Department mightwish to include consideration that just possibly the AyatollahKhamenei might have been issuing something more along the lines oftaqiyya in the form of a fatwa? Perhaps that might be a good idea. So far the negotiations with Iran have led to absolutely nodiscernible modification in Iranian work towards reaching nuclearweapons capability. The sole lull in their drive came in responseto the remarkably quick and easy defeat of their neighbor"smilitary during the second Iraq war which removed Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein from leadership in Iraq. This short stall of their program as theywaited to see who was next on the American list after Iraq lastedless than six months, or so intelligence has reported. We mightremember the Libyan reaction to this same event when theysurrendered their entire nuclear research and stockpiles and openedup their country to full inspections by the IAEA. Outside of thatblip in the graph, Iranian efforts in both missile research anddevelopment and drive for nuclear weapons has steadily gainedground meeting one requirement after another on their path tohaving ballistic nuclear tipped weapons, also referred to as adeliverable nuclear weapon. Currently the missile technology of theIranians has progressed from inaccurate medium range rockets toprogrammable targeted missiles with two-thousand mile range whichis classified as ballistic missiles, their next achievement willlikely be intercontinental ballistic missiles, something they havedisplayed being near to achieving with the launches of orbitalsatellites. But not to worry, their Supreme Leader issued a fatwalikely aimed at the West as taqiyya, but he did issue that fatwa. Meanwhile, the Iranians have been refusing to actually meet any ofthe demands or requests by the West and only giving platitudes andpromises to the United Nations, IAEA and the P5+1 by agreeing andeven signing on to agreements and arrangements while having notangible intents to actually honor their stated concessions.Despite the Iranian lack of honest dealings, the latest approach ofthe P5+1 has been to modify their demands to allow Iran to continueto enrich Uranium but only to a level of three and a half percentand to forgo their program which has produced uranium to twentypercent enrichment. They are also requesting that Iran release allof their stockpiles of twenty percent uranium and rely on foreignsuppliers to provide nuclear material for medical usage. Iran hasbristled at this suggestion and is demanding they retain theirright to enrich uranium to whatever levels their requirementsdemand which would include the twenty percent level for medicaluse. The fact that assessments by specialists that Iran hasproduced twenty percent uranium well in excess of any amountsrequired even using the most generous of assessments does notappear to have any relevance to either side of the deliberations.Iran is seeking and the P5+1 may actually be considering thatsanctions on Iranian petroleum assets and their banking systems berelieved or completely removed in return for Iran agreeing to signto allowing full inspections by the IAEA of all nuclear sites. Ofcourse this would only apply to those sites which have beenidentified and not those sites which Iran has been able to keepfrom disclosure or discovery. So, how does Israel fit into all of these machinations? The mainconcern towards Israel has been mentioned by or implied by theObama Administration, the European Union, particularly theirforeign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and others from within thegovernments of the P5+1 has been preventing any military actionsagainst the Iranian nuclear sites. The efforts to prevent Israeliactions have gone as far as revealing any plans or preliminarysteps Israel may take in preparation for executing such missions.There have been leaks mostly from the American White House, thoughnot traceable directly to President Obama yet, which have labelednumerous IAF training exercises as preparations for an Iranianstrike, revealed the potential that the Israeli purchase of twodecommissioned airfields in Azerbaijan located north of Iran andconsiderably closer to Iran could be used as a jumping off point ora refuel and emergency platform supporting an Iran strike, andreleases and inferences of the extent of Israeli intelligenceoperations concerning the Iranian nuclear programs. It might beclaimed that many in the P5+1 are more concerned with preventingIsraeli military actions more than they care to prevent Iranbecoming a nuclear armed nation. Yet, these are also the sameforces which are insisting that Israel trust that they haveprotecting Israel from the threatened nuclear attacks by Iran asone of their primary reason d"etre. With their track record,who could blame Israel if they chose not to share information ortheir intents with even those claiming to be their friends andallies after such treatment of their efforts? The real problem has become the fact that only one side has shownany willingness to compromise, though both sides have shownmovement in their positions. The P5+1 held an original positionthat Iran had to surrender all uranium enrichment; all stockpilesof enriched uranium; rely on foreign supply of fuel rods for theirreactors; surrender spent fuel rods in exchange for replacements;rely on foreign supply of all medical usage of nuclear elements;close permanently the Natanz facilities; open all sites includingreleasing the names and locations of all nuclear related and rocketresearch sites; and had yet to learn of the Furdow installationsoutside Qom or known of the high explosive research at an Iranianmilitary facility. The P5+1 have modified their requests,downgraded from demands, that Iran cease enrichment beyond threeand a half percent, surrender all stockpiles of twenty percentenriched uranium, the closure of the Furdow facilities, surrenderall uranium enriched beyond three and a half percent, allowinspections of all known nuclear sites, and in return the P5+1 willpermit the continued enrichment of uranium at Natanz to three and ahalf percent, manufacture of their own fuel rods, freedom to buildadditional reactors, Iran to oversee the decommissioned fuel rods,and no longer making demands on the missile or high explosiveresearch carried out by the Iranian military usually by the IslamicRevolutionary Guards Corps. While the P5+1 have taken significantstrides towards surrendering to Iranian demands, the Iranians havemoved the goalposts further down the field by demanding not onlyenrichment to levels for use in their power generation reactors butalso to levels for medical usage which would allow enrichment totwenty percent instead of only three and a half percent and haveinsisted that their research into missiles and explosives is not tobe the concern of any foreign interest and thus must be allowed. There is good reason as to why there are requests that Iransurrender enrichment to twenty percent and to limit them to onlythree and a half percent. To enrich uranium to the over ninetypercent necessary for weaponizing takes significantly less effortand thus less time when starting with twenty percent enricheduranium. The difference is measured in months, not day or hours. Itwould take under six weeks for Iran to reach the needed amount ofenriched uranium from twenty percent stock while it would likelytake a minimum of four and as long as six months or even more toreach the same conditions for a weapon starting with three and ahalf percent enrichment as the starting level. The measurableadditional time would also make it much easier for intelligenceefforts to discover an Iranian move towards nuclear weapons whichmakes it all the more difficult. The intent is presumably toprevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, not just aiming toknow when they have done so. This prevention is made easier themore Iran is restricted in enrichment procedures making none themost preferable amount. If Iran were forced to totally stop uraniumenrichment, then all that would need to be detected would be theuse of the specialized centrifuges which have telltale measurableproperties. By permitting enrichment to any level would make itmore difficult to detect Iran breaking the agreements asinspections would be necessary to detect even traces of higherenriched uranium. Requiring total disclosure and full inspections,including surprise unannounced spot inspections, along withpermitting inspectors to inspect any or all military installationsto check for any covert nuclear work, thus making the discovery ofthe unknown nuclear facilities would make efforts to prevent Iranreaching the breakout point far more difficult if not impossible.With the beginning of a slide away from their initial demands andweakening the requirements of Iran is not a good indicator of theresolve to prevent a nuclear armed Iran. Perhaps observing theallowed capitulation to Iran by the P5+1 is what has driven Israelto take a more cautious and nervous approach to the whole Iraniansituation. How long before the State Department geniuses decidethat twenty percent enrichment and inspections of the lobby of theTehran International Airport will be the level Iran will berequired to permit? Remember the one other item in this dance, Irandoes not need the world"s permission, they simply requirethat they gain sufficient time until they produce nuclear weaponrywhich then makes all negotiations a moot point. If the world,especially any of the members of the P5+1, is serious aboutstopping the Iranian drive for nuclear weapon capability, then theyneed to stop the music, end the dance, and lay down the law andcommit to whatever consequence may be required to put an end toIranian progress, anything less is simply capitulation to evilintents. Beyond the Cusp. The e-commerce company in China offers quality products such as China Pregnant Belly Band , China Medical Compression Stockings, and more. For more , please visit Adult Incontinence Pants today!
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